[H1] Nation-Building and Minority Rights in the Middle East:
A Dialectic Dynamic
Numerous and converging indications suggest that the religious minorities of the Middle East are living at a critical juncture in this early 21 st century. 1 Every other day, news bring the subject to the front pages, mentioning tensions raised in Algeria by the conversion of a few dozen citizens to Christian evangelism, persecutions suffered by non-Muslims in Northern Iraq, sectarian strife in the rest of the country or in Lebanon. And although full of promises, the revolutionary wind blowing from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic in the early 2010s raises new interrogations. What is often referred to as a global minority crisis "in the Arab world" or "in the Muslim world" is a complex phenomenon which combines structural and cultural dimensions, and needs to be examined in light of its historical background and sociological context. On the one hand, it is a structural crisis where demography and law are determining factors. A long-term difference in birth rates and emigration traditions between religious and confessional groups resulted in deep demographic imbalance while several decades of discriminating legislation deepened the gap. 2 On the other hand, the current "minority crisis" is a crisis of difference: a crisis where "relation between individuals is characterised by uncertainty" because the old social and cultural order is falling apart. 3 Together, structural and cultural factors combine. In view of the hundreds of thousands of people who took refuge in another country of the Middle East or emigrated in the West during the recent decades, we cannot but acknowledge that several religious and confessional 4 minorities do not enjoy freedom in their homeland where they may be symbolically excluded from the public sphere and political life and more than often oppressed and even condemned to exile. To use Hirschmanian categories, their response to their precarious situation is either exit or silence.
The more so because in several circumstances this existential crisis lead to multidimensional violence: the structural violence of unequal constitutional laws enacted for specific identity groups; the spatial displacement or forced exile of local communities; assaults against individuals; street fighting along lines separating religious or sectarian communities; or even unnamed civil war. Truly, social sciences cannot underestimate the seriousness of the crisis. Mainly, history and sociology are needed to look into the genealogy of the crisis and take its context into account in order to overcome the blunt characterisation of violence against religious minorities as a cultural stigma specifically associated with the societies and polities of the Middle East. Political sociology, for its part, is required to shed light on the complex relation between the political power which claims sovereignty and the exclusive use of "legitimate violence" (or legal use of force) -"the state" -on the one hand, and victimized and powerless sectarian communities, on the other hand.
In order to do so, this chapter is organised under three main themes.
First, it offers a retrospective look at the process of importation and adaptation of the nation-state formula in the newly created and/or newly independent entities of the Middle East. The main hypothesis is that diverging constitutional choices -either the choice of government of the demographic majority (Tocquevillian democracy) or the choice of "consensus democracy" -namely the government of a coalition of identity groups acknowledging specific constitutional rights for the minorities 6 -shaped state-society relation differently in each country of the region where they yielded both positive and negative effects which need to be assessed.
Second, this chapter reflects on today"s revival of the minority issue and endeavours to analyze its specificity. My contention is that the minority crisis of today is radically different from the crisis which stirred social and political mobilisations in the 19 th century although it is also the product of a combination of a specific international conjuncture -"glocalization" 7 -and its internalisation by local societies in the Middle East. Namely, I assume that the authoritarian regimes established in the region since the mid-1950s tend to compensate for the failure of their pro-active national development policies and flamboyant regional ambitions by "redeploying the state": leaving the management of national economies to private actors and investing rather in security and in the cultural and religious sectors they had until then neglected. 8 Correlatively, the minority issue becomes the great "question of the century" 9 fed by exacerbated identity fundamentalisms and established at the global level as a legitimate problem through the birth of a new international humanitarian Law. This is why the term "minority" should be discussed beyond its indistinct reference to groups whose selfdesignation, legal status and political function vary widely.
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In the third part, I look at Middle East identity mobilisations in the defence and promotion of minority groups and show how they mirror the nationalist ideologies of the ruling regimes, often using the same resources and the same strategies, thus questioning the supposed contrast between the powerful state and the powerless minority. My hypothesis is that the ruling power and the minority compete in the construction of we-groups. They concur in the strengthening of identity boundaries in order to access to rare material and symbolic resources. In this respect, religious diasporas play a specific role in politicising identities at home, exposing them and supporting them. However, the surprising resilience of the nationstate suggests that what is taking place between state leadership and minority groups in many countries of the Middle East is a political exchange of specific nature and means, which challenges the notion of citizenship.
Examination of these three dimensions of the minority issue in the Middle East needs to be carried out in comparative perspective in order to open up the understanding of a region often stigmatised as "exceptional" and un-amenable to global change. At the same time, a sound comprehension of the current situation requires taking into account the specific path dependence of the local states. Therefore, I adopt a historical sociology perspective and try to read the current crisis in light of the crisis that struck religious minorities in the late Ottoman era after the adoption of a revolutionary code of citizenship and the growing interference of European powers in the affairs of the non-Muslim minorities of the Empire. 11 To this day, the heritage of the millet system, 12 the recognition of freedom of religion and culture (and sometimes language) and the allocation of a specific personal status to non-Muslim 8 Levy 2006. 9 The quote is from Debray 2008: 227: "La question des minorités est la grande question du siècle. Plus la planète se resserre, plus les distances se creusent." 10 For lack of respect of such a requirement, analysis might be plagued by ideological prejudice. See Bengio and Ben-Dor 1999. 11 Karpat 1982. 12 "The millet system of the Ottoman Empire enabled Christian, Jewish and Muslim communities to co-exist more or less peacefully, each with their own form of self-government. While the millet system was generally human and tolerant of group differences, it was not a liberal society, for it did not tolerate individual dissent within its constituent communities. Rather it was a deeply conservative, theocratic and patriarchal society". Kymlicka 1992: 143. confessional communities are the major stakes of the legal and judicial institutions in most regional states. At the time of independence a large majority of them kept the confessional variable into account when enacting and applying personal and family law. Some of them even inscribed the legal pluralism inherited from the Ottomans into their constitutional rule.
Today, the millet system -or at least its remaining -imposes a specific meaning (in the Geertzian sense) 13 to the organisation of the local societies. It provides clues for understanding the power brokering at work between the minorities and the state. But at the same time, "it distils complex social categories into bounded categories whose correspondence to reality is problematic." 14 By consequence, it is a controversial concept as some analysts consider it a source of inspiration for liberalising the status of minority groups while others denounce its fragmenting role and the subsequent paralysis of the nation-building process in the Middle East.
[ and the only difference admitted is between "workers" (wage-owners) and other citizens in order to enhance the representation of the former. This system is supposed the best suited to 17 "Il est de l'essence même des gouvernements démocratiques que l'empire de la majorité y soit absolu; car en dehors de la majorité, dans les démocraties, il n'y a rien qui résiste"; Their central reference to Islam allowed each of them to rule arbitrarily in the name of equity, social justice and common good, and by the same token to claim to protect non-Muslim minorities maintained under their domination by means of social contracts ("pacts"). Majority rule, in these cases, amounted to the impossibility of integration in the national community of individuals belonging to minority groups and their forced submission to the dominant rule.
Since the mid-1950s authoritarian implementation of the so-called majority rule and reference to an exclusive or dominant common identity amounted to impose a "forced consensus" to religious out-groups. 22 What was really taking place was that a family or clannish coalition managed to seize power by violent and/or illicit means and monopolize political and economic positions in several kingdoms and republics of the Middle East. What could be observed was that instead of governing for the sake of the nation, these rulers coopted and excluded segments of the society on a regional, ethnic or confessional basis, sometimes imposing a ruling majority at odd with its demographic and social weight. Although more recent, experiments of the so-called "Islamic rule" proved even more detrimental to minorities because of the discrepancy between legally imposed inequalities and official claims for theocratic universalism. In the eye of a ruler referring to a privileged link between God and the society, minority groups -even those granted a legal status and some 21 Ernst Gellner quoted in Leca and Schemeil 1983 : p. 479 . 22 Copeaux 2000. 23 In several cases they condemned the demographic majority (Arab Sunnis in Syria, Arab Shia in Iraq) to political minorisation and forbade the birth of program-based alternative majority. Cf. Salamé 1991. 24 By network I simply mean stable schemes of horizontal interaction.
kind of state protection such as ahl al-kitâb 25 -remained social anomalies meant to be either assimilated by the umma or expelled. Consequently, Bahais were persecuted in Islamic Iran, the Sudanese regime fought continuous wars against its animist and Christian populations, and the Saudis treated their Shia as a second class population at best.
Under such rulers, societal response to the alternative integration/exclusion (either you belong to the nation or you are condemned to symbolic or exile) revolved around the three famous Hirschmanian strategic categories: either tacit submission ("loyalty") because the dominant discourse could only be challenged in privacy; or exposure and political mobilisation ("voice") against the rule of unanimity; or concealment and exile ("exit") because the cost of the previous strategy was not sustainable. 26 Until 1990, when the conflict between the capitalist and socialist worlds over-determined and kept "in the fridge" ethnic and religious identities, most religious minorities of the Middle East chose the first response.
Also, many minority members expected to be part of the promised national development, -umma) . 33 In these states, identity played a crucial role in the distribution and exercise of power. Moreover, the relation to the state of social groups, but also of individuals belonging to these groups, remained partly based on ascribed identities rather than acquired qualities and virtues or constructed interests.
Ascribed identities were hold as the legitimate criteria to confer cultural, education and even territorial autonomy, and more generally to distribute functions, positions, and material and symbolic public goods. There was more: the majority itself, either demographic or political, (2005) 6 out of the 66 seats allocated to the majority system are reserved for Christians. 33 At odd with their demographic weight (3-4%) but also with their remarkable share in the private economic power (40%), according to Sabbagh 2004. became contaminated in return by the practices of the leadership and tended also to establish its relation to the state through confessional criteria, playing on the centrality of its identity within the polity. Both government policies and societal responses concurred to reinforce sectarian discourses, behaviour and interactions. Finally, the society as a whole tended to formulate its political expectations and demands in terms of identity privileges, frustration or alienation.
Identity politics gained momentum as development and welfare policies waned. It was argued that, by producing an instant photography of a country"s diversity, the confessional (or ethnic) variable offered a fair criterion to distribute political (as well as economic and military) power between segments of the population. Once the groups were counted, fair distribution of power could be organised. Strong communal organisation and especially the presence of a powerful communal leadership might ensure better participation in the state.
Rather than competing or splitting apart, the sectarian groups of a given country would supposedly become safe about their respective status and share of the cake, and able to come to an understanding over power devolution. Minorities, once recognised and legalised, might be full actors on the public scene.
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Such a positive assessment was contrasted to the dramatic failure of the "majority"
rule, a political system still plaguing several countries of the region at the turn of the millennium. Eager to see the Middle East "democratize," the US and its allies not only launched devastating military campaigns, they also ambitioned to put an end to the local despotic regimes and their "majority" rule and searched for constitutional systems altogether adapted to plural nations and respectful of liberal consensus. In the opinion of many international experts in state-and nation (re)-building, elite consensus became the key to fair political representation of minorities as it was credited to organise fair power sharing between confessional (or ethnic) segments of a country"s population. "Lebanonisation," once a term which stigmatised the shattering agonistic societies in the Balkans, became a desirable model.
In Lebanon, the executive and the legislature were meant to be equitably distributed along the supposed demographic weight of the 18 confessional indigenous groups, which were granted cultural, administrative and educational autonomy. 35 The political history of modern Lebanon was referred to as a constant search for inter-confessional balance at state level and the government of a large coalition altogether representative of the country"s major communities and respectful of its minorities. Certainly, the respective flaws of the majority and consensus rules in securing fair minority representation and promoting democratic transition do not exonerate analysts and decision-makers for their long-lasting underestimation of minority issues in the Middle East.
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After WW2, the imperative of top-down national development in countries then labelled "underdeveloped" was promoted by liberal and Marxist theoreticians concurrently. They were far less attentive to primordial identity differences than to inequalities of revenue and class.
The minorities they had in mind were sociological minorities such as the children deprived 41 Salamey and Payne 2008. 42 As discussed in the Syrian case by Belkin and Schofer 2004. 43 Picard 2010. 44 For example Picard 1980. from access to health care and education; women deprived from equal human rights; and economically deprived peripheries. And they sometimes deliberately ignored cultural differences in the name of collective improvement. But today, as the cover is being lifted from the identity cauldron and the minority question has become a legitimate and in some cases pressing issue, we should remain cautious not to be drawn into another hegemonic discourse and suspicious of the role of sectarian entrepreneurs in driving social dynamics and the negative effects of their instrumentation.
[H2] "Glocalization" and the minority question
The awakening of the "minority question" in the Middle East was largely the product of the new conjuncture of the post-bipolar 1990s: domestically, authoritarian states were forced to become "modest" and retreat from the economic field; in return they "re-deployed"
and invested in the cultural and security fields; internationally, Western powers and NGOs" awareness of the issue of human and cultural rights grew in response of the growing tensions in the region and thanks to information channelled through diaspora networks.
[H3] New challenges for the state
The new visibility and topicality of the minority question can be linked with the redeployment of the state in the Middle East, namely its retreat from the economic field and, in return, its strong involvement in the awakening and promotion of ascribed identities as well as in their securitisation.
Since the mid-1980s, a majority of governments in the region were compelled to adopt structural adjustment plans and partially de-regulate their national economies under direct and indirect pressure from international financial institutions. In accordance with the new liberalisation dogmas, they chose to get rid of their redistributive policies, totally or partially.
Most of them cut public subventions and reduced their intervention in the domains of health, education, lodgings and subsidies to basic commodities. In order to trim the national budget they also suppressed a number of public jobs traditionally destined to mask a high level of unemployment. These rough policies affected differently the local societies according to their heterogeneity. At the core of each patrimonial state, the opening of the market (infitah) to new bourgeoisies was organised and controlled by the same political military elite and along the same primordial networks of identity (confessional and/or ethnic). Collaboration between political leaders and economic entrepreneurs took the form of clientelist exchange (dyadic and reciprocal) based on sectarian and matrimonial proximity. By contrast, distant peripheries, powerless social actors such as women and youth, and marginal cultural groups such as minority religious communities were affected as access to public goods became restricted through inter-personal filters. While facilitating an enlargement of the bourgeoisie, this new Middle East crony capitalism enhanced intra-sectarian solidarity and inter-sectarian competition by organising either rapprochement or marginalisation of given confessional groups.
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As the domestic and foreign private sectors took the lead in the economic field, the domination of the state over its society through the redistribution of rents wore away along with the discrediting of its legitimizing ideology. 46 Thereafter the necessity for the state to redeploy and invest in domains previously neglected. Monarchies as well as republics endeavoured to raise patriotic feelings among their population and substitute a new form of attachment to the regime for the trust in the welfare state. Their investment in identity politics took a strong discursive dimension: publication of history and civic education school books, glorification of turath and its display in newly built museums, and the intensive use of i.t.
communication tools were used to re-invent and re-format collective identities based on affects and private memories. 47 Moreover, the new patriotism promoted by the regimes stressed a new distinction, not between the domestic and the external realms but within the country, between the national community and its domestic enemies, between loyal citizens and Others whose belongings remained dubious because they were not part of the confessional (or ethnic) ruling we-group, and therefore suspect of foreign collusion. The most important political issue was now in the name of which identity group the state acted, who was regarded as its legitimate owner, and who was entitled to its services. 48 Therefore, politics became increasingly formulated and exerted on a non-negotiable mode as if it implied subscribing to a rigid (ideological or religious) belief. Accordingly, politicisation of sectarianism became a central aspect of state-building through which the « people » and the regime were mutually related within the ideal of a legitimate order. While the nation-state was 45 As discussed in the case of the Lebanese Sunni bourgeoisie in Johnson 1986 . For Syria see Bahout 1994 Kienle 1992 . 46 Henry and Springborg 2001. 47 Examples of each of these strategies in Gershoni and Jankowski 1997; and Davis 2005. 48 Empire with its negative effect on civil society and entrepreneurial spirit.
Finally, identity politics initiated by Middle East authoritarian states in compensation for economic liberalisation bore a security dimension. While systematic statistical and police control substituted for development in power practices in a Foucaldian manner, 50 the spreading of trans-boundary networks and global interdependence meant that enemies of the state had to be fought within, precisely among minority groups supposedly alien to the identity and project of the political majority. 51 In the past, communal groups opposed to the government were suspect of collusion with European powers, now they were accused to be "agents" of Israel and the United States. Instead of being part of the legitimate political game, protestation by minorities became stigmatised as a manipulation by the West and Israel, and repressed through land confiscation, restriction of public expression and heavy security rules.
[H3] Minorities, the "question of the century"
The rise of identity politics on the domestic scene mirrored the change taking place on the international scene. 49 Glass 1991. 50 Foucault 1983 . 51 Kumaraswamy 2003. Until recently, international Law legislated exclusively about native minorities in colonisation states (e.g. the Inuit people). As for the international covenant on civil and political rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966, it protected the cultural and religious rights of individual members of minority groups, respecting the sovereignty of the state and reflecting its reluctance to take into account sub-national collective aspirationsespecially of political order. 52 Then, in the 1990s, the fall of the Soviet Empire drew the minority issue "out of the fridge". A new legitimate problematic prevailed. International Law specialists began elaborating a more extensive and politically consequent legal definition of the minority. "National minority" was henceforth considered a cultural entity, concentrated on a territory, with a past experience of political independence before it was incorporated to a larger state entity. [H2] Competition, integration, or adaptation?
Actors of the Middle Eastern public arena, be they states, organised communities or even national NGOs, prove sensitive to the current international debate on the minority issue -even in countries the most protected from external influence such as the Islamic Republic.
They also react and adapt to domestic societal dynamics in such way that the politicisation of primordial identities can be described as an interactive process: first, it is a two-level process taking place simultaneously at state and official institutional level and at societal level of routine encounters and dynamics; then the politicisation process implies that state and society act, react and carry out successive adjustments of frame and practices. The mimesis between the ruling group (the "state") and the opposition has been underlined in the case of ethnic minorities such as the Kurds in Turkey and Arab lands, who borrowed nationalism and other 56 Corm 2006: 64. ideological and institutional tools for nation-building from their rulers and adapted them in order to dominate their own society. 57 But mimesis was rarely observed in the case of sectarian groups because few of them raised their identity claims to the point of demanding large autonomy like some segments of the Assyrian community in Syria or even calling for secession like some political parties in southern Sudan or in Lebanon during the civil war.
Most confessional communities while not adopting such extreme position are prone to shape their collective identity according to the "national" model 58 i.e. through discrete cultural, moral and sociological -not to mention psychological or physical -traits. They also borrow the social engineering and political practices experienced by the state in order to build their own national community, organise its institutions and mobilise its members. They use the same strategies and the same resources -inventing genealogies and hierarchies, distributing goods and security, repressing dissidents. 59 Paradoxically, in their competition for the construction of rival we-groups the ruling power and the minority concur in strengthening mutually excluding identity boundaries in order to take over limited material and symbolic resources. Together they turn dormant and fluctuating collective identities into tangible sectarian groups. Diasporas have become a driving force behind this interactive process as they exacerbate identity fundamentalisms at the two ends of the migratory network. 60 As a matter of consequence, the minority issue succeeds in opening a new debate and entailing new political negotiations within several Middle Eastern states. It challenges the relation between the ruling power and the population and calls for a reappraisal of the notion of citizenship.
[H3] Local identities, nationalism, and the diaspora An imported ideology, nationalism was willingly adopted by the ruling elite of the Middle East since the 19 th century. It gave meaning to their disrupted political life, allowed them to rely to their past and project into their future. 61 Nationalism also spread among members of the confessional (and ethnic) elite who did not wish to return to the millet system for all its limits and flaws and could not anyway return to it after the imperial order was swept by the creation of nations-states. Now, the model for collective demands and the promotion of an identity group implied territorial sovereignty, homogeneous cultural identity and political 57 See the publications of Hamit Bozarslan on the Kurdish question in French. 58 In this respect, the translation of millet by "nation" induced much confusion since the 19 th century. 59 Picard 1994. 60 See the chapter by Grégoire Delhaye. 61 Michel Foucault calls this temporary shared meaning "regime of subjectivity. " Foucault 1976 " Foucault : 1001 autonomy.
62 Between conflicting ambitions, there was hardly a middle term: wherever the governing state was denying minority rights, the confessional minority denied belonging to the nation-state thus raising the level of contest and tension between dominant and minority ideologies.
A noticeable change of the globalisation era is that minorities, once deprived from access to the public space, oppressed, and sometimes physically threatened in their homeland, turn in numbers from "exit" to "voice" at the instigation of their exiled members. 63 In their new migratory space, these migrant members generally enjoy freedom of faith and expression. Consequently, they are prone to re-politicisation and to turn into "cultural mediators" especially when they benefit from dual citizenship. Of course, diaspora involvement in democratisation processes in the original homeland should not be over- institutions, and also of over-sized churches in order to raise the visibility of the community, especially in the remote underdeveloped Syrian Jazirah. Their numerous and vibrant websites and news agencies harboured confusion between confessional and national belonging. On the one hand they negotiated with the local states for the sake of the community; on the other hand they interpreted any public policy decision as a possible means to victimize it, any political vote or deliberation as a survival stake. And finally they formulated projects of autonomy and even independence completely at odd with the reality on the ground. 66 In this matter, they offered a complex example of the mixture of powerlessness and empowerment, of escalation and compromise, of attachment and alienation which characterise today"s minorities in the Middle East. Middle Eastern states will remain stuck in intractable identity conflicts as long as they do not envisage a limited reconfiguration of power by adding to the three constitutionally legitimate dimensions of citizenship (civic, political and human) the promotion of individual and collective cultural rights in their society and polity and more specifically in their constitutional Law. Because identity politics has become a dominant preoccupation all over the world in this early 21 st century, such a change of configuration is needed in many states, democratic and authoritarian. However, in the Middle East, where national identity was more than often built on the false premises of cultural homogeneity, the political centre can hardly acknowledge pluralism without de-legitimizing itself. This is often where the democratization process meets its limits and where the notion of political exchange becomes operational: the state could exchange some measures of cultural autonomy for the compliance of the minority with its collective regulation. It should make up the economic deficit of its cultural peripheries -namely its religious peripheries-, meet some of their symbolic demands in matter of public display of identities and collective commemorations, and eventually satisfy their claims for more autonomy of cultural and educational institutions. At this point, the state would not have to acknowledge a nationalist character to the demands of the sectarian 69 Political exchange implies the building of a compromise in order to regulate interactions between public policy networks. See North 1990 ; and more specifically for plural countries Painter 2000. groups. 70 Co-existence between the (state) national culture and religious sub-cultures would subsequently be organised following the principle of "hegemonial exchange" i.e. mutual accommodation between the autonomous (better than "powerful") central state and less autonomous (rather than "powerless") segmented interests "on the basis of commonly accepted procedural norms, rules, or understandings". 71 A positive point in this direction is that Arab political sociology establishes a distinction between jinsiyya (nationality) and muwâtana (citizenship).This suggests its affinities with the liberal model of distinction between cultural and political identities. It opens the way to a possible coexistence of a public space blind to cultural differences with differentiated communal spaces 72 although a delicate point concerns the difficulty of "neutralising" Islam in the constitutional framing of the Middle East states in view of its historical and ethical weight.
More generally, a positive political exchange between state centre and religious peripheries cannot take place as long as local polities are plagued by a deficit in the respect of civic, political and human rights -a deficit affecting every citizen, irrespective of his confessional or cultural (or ethnic) identity. Here again, the minority issue in the Middle East proves closely related to the issue of democratization and the respect of the rule of Law: on the one hand, collective minority demands might be alleviated by the promotion of individual rights; on the other hand, respected individuals would become respectful citizens; they might promote the virtues and loyalties required by democratic citizenship, among which the acceptance of identity differences. Nation-building and minority rights might improve dialectically.
[H2] Conclusion
It is all the more difficult to conclude such a chapter because this early 21 st century is probably witnessing the peak of identity politics all over the world. Like development theory, identity politics might display its flaws, encounter its limits, and be dismissed in the coming period. This makes today"s reflection upon religious minorities in the Middle East all the more fragile. It is also why scholars should be wise to keep in mind two basic knowledges in social sciences: first, that identity discourses and processes always need to be read in a 70 This is probably the watershed separating confessional demands from ethnic demands as ethnic identities/movements are prone to transform into identities/national movements. 71 Rothschild 1985: 98-101. 72 A source of inspiration might be the Habermassian model of "constitutional patriotism" combining a civic ideology with the public respect of differences; Habermas 2001.
